The Mind: Five Kinds of Physicalism

Another 20th century response to the question of mind (not to mention Cartesian Dualism) was Physicalism. Unfortunately, Physicalism, like ice cream, comes in more than one flavor. Before we delve to deeply into the varieties of physicalism, a broad explanation is in order.
Physicalism, which was called Materialism in some early incarnations, asserts that the mind is part of the physical universe and subject to the physical laws that govern the universe. They tend to identify the mind with the brain as the physical embodiment of it. By placing the mind physically into the body by way of the brain, the interaction problem disappears. No more is there any question about just how messages move to and from the body and the mind.
Now, with the broad strokes out of the way, it's time to move on to the specific incarnations of physicalism.
Type Physicalism adheres to the idea that particular brain states could be successfully identified with particular mental states. In other words, the sensation of pain would be able to be identified with some particular state in the brain, or the state of pleasure at eating well made meal would be able to be identified with a brain state.
Of course, this seemingly simple solution becomes problematic very quickly. The most prevalent problem is the fact that there are a great many different types of brains. It would be difficult to be able to establish with any certainty the equivalence of brain states in different kinds of brains. The less prevalent problem rests with the possibility that different brains inside of a species, for example, may have subtle differences that preclude being able to draw the equivalence.
Token Physicalism shares some basic ideas with Type Physicalism. It holds that mental states are identifiable with physical states. However, it does not presume that the mental state and the physical state be identifiable with one another, merely that a mental state is identifiable with a physical state.
This position is problematic, as well. The big problem here is how to establish that physical states represent mental states if there is no direct physical correlation between them.
Eliminative Physicalism holds that mental states as such are a fiction. As such, there is no need to try to tie them to a physical state. Under Eliminative Physicalism, there are no mental states of belief, pleasure, or desire, to name a few. They argue that such mental states are merely holdovers from outdated psychological theorizing and have no place in a theory of mind.
The problem faces here is how to explain the apparent existence of exactly these kind of motivating mental states.
Reductive Physicalism holds that theories of mental states, as such, can be explained in terms of physical theories about the brain. Where this breaks from Eliminative Physicalism is that there is no denial of the mental states in question. It simply denies the need to address them at all. It is primarily concerned with brain states.
Non-Reductive Physicalism asserts that attempts to reduce mental states to simple brain states is a failed endeavor. The principle argument they make is that simple brain state theories cannot account for complex mental states. Another way to look at it is to think about the difference between using building blocks as a child and designing a skyrise. You can build something that stands with building blocks. However, the simple principles you employ to build with such toys cannot account for the vast array of variables and generalizations required to understand the forces at work in building a skyrise.
Both Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism suffer from the same problem. Neither one can provide any solid evidence to defend their positions.

The Mind: Behaviorism

Behaviorism was one 20th Century attempt to deal with the problem of the mind. For the hardcore philosopher, there are three distinct types of of Behaviorism. For the purposes of this blog, we will only deal with what is generally referred to as Psychological Behaviorism.
This type of Behaviorism is usually ascribed to the Psychologists John Watson and B. F. Skinner. What they assert is effectively the position that whatever mental states may exist (if they exist at all) are not publicly observable and, therefore, beyond the reach of the scientific method. What is publicly observable is behavior and, as such, behavior is all we have upon which to base our conclusions. What they have done is to effectively bracket the question of the existence of the mind entirely and say, "We can't get to it, so we will ignore or deny it's existence in favor of observable data."
While some behaviorists are not willing to deny outright the possibility of internal mental states, it is not within the doctrine of pure behaviorism to endorse or acknowledge it. As such, Behaviorism, while parading itself as a theory of mind, is for all intents and purposes a theory of avoidance of the mind.

The Mind: Cartesian Substance Dualism Part 2

While the Cartesian conception of the mind can be appealing, insofar as it offers the possibility of some kind of life beyond the mortal coil, it is rife with flaws.
One of the major objections to this take on the mind is that is seems unlikely, if not impossible, for a non-material mental substance to control a material physical substance. The question becomes: "What is the means, or mechanism, for the required communication?"
Descartes answers this question by citing something that he calls "animal spirits" (tiny bodies that travel through the blood) which would communicate the mind's messages to the body. Naturally, this "solution" is equally problematic since the tiny bodies are still material entities and subject to the same communication problem as the larger human form.
There cannot be a connection between the mind and body at a physical level because the mind is inherently non-physical in nature.
The other major objection is one of evolution. If evolution is a process of natural selection, governed by physical laws, how does a non-physical substance arise? Given the substantial evidence for the reality of evolution, this question is not one that can be avoided. There would seem to be no call for, nor a cause of, a non-physical substance. Such a substance would seem to defy all of the principles of the physical universe. The laws of entropy, in particular, would seem to stand in direct contradiction of such a substance. The tendency for all things to seek a simpler, static state would undermine the potential for a very complicated substance that is not subject to any laws of decay.
While Cartesian Substance Dualism has fallen out of favor as an explanatory system for the mind-body problem, it still influences and directs, in many ways, the course of how we discuss the problem philosophically. Any system that will be ultimately accepted has no alternative but to offer a solution to these two problems. As you will see when we move on in the following articles, these problems are not readily solved.

The Mind: Cartesian Substance Dualism: Part 1

Theories about the nature of human mind reach back at least as far as Ancient Greece. Plato wrote about it and so did Aristotle. However, Philosophy of Mind in the modern era begins with René Descartes. Descartes was a French philosopher, mathematician, scientist and writer during the 17th century.
He is also responsible for a skeptical method, sometimes referred to as Cartesian Doubt, where nothing is taken for granted as a given. It was through the employment of this method, in an attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, that we find the meat of his argument for substance dualism and his theory of mind. This exercise in doubt is chronicled in his [I]Meditations on First Philosophy[/I].
Without descending into a full-blown explanation of the [I]Meditations[/I], much of which is off topic, substance dualism can be explained more or less as follows. There are, effectively, two substances which compose a person: material and immaterial substances. Material substances (bodies) are defined by being extensible (having shape and form in 3-dimensional space), having duration through time, and being subject to decay and death. Immaterial substances (minds) are defined primarily by not being extensible, not being subject to decay and death, and also having duration through time.
Descartes came to his conclusion about these immaterial substances by his skeptical method. He posed himself the question, is there anything about which i cannot doubt? His answer to this question was, in the [I]Meditations[/I], "I am a thinking thing." The more famous version, The Cogito ("cogito, ergo, sum") is often mis-attributed to the [I]Mediations[/I]. It actually comes from his [I]Discourse on Method [/I]and translates to "I think, therefore, I am." In either case, the gist is the same, the immaterial is for Descartes the principle substance.
His argument for the statement that, "I am a thinking thing," essentially goes like this:
While I may be able to doubt the existence of my body, or the entire material world, I cannot doubt the existence of my own mind. When I try to doubt it, I am confronted with the fact that someone must be doubting. That I can doubt my existence proves my existence.
These claims came under fire almost as soon as the work was published and have been receiving criticism since. In Part 2 of Cartesian Substance Dualism, some of the objections that have been raised will be examined.,

The Mind

What is the human mind? Seems like a simple enough question, in form anyways. Also seems as though it would be a question long since answered by now. There are six billion or so of these human minds wandering around on this planet. It would seem that at least one of them would be able to answer that question. Yet, the nature of the mind remains an open question. There are major and minor, secular and religious, theories about the mind and yet, we can't say for sure whether those theories are even on the right track.

That said, there are some things we can say about the mind. First of all, the entire modern discussion regarding the mind has been dictated by Descartes. He claimed, in the first half of the 1600's, that the mind (soul) and the body were separate substances. The argument, as such, has proceeded inevitably from this point and gone no further. Generally, people either come down as being in favor of this idea, the mind is mysterious, defies categorization and study, and will continue to be and do so. The responding side is that the mind is a function of a purely material or an organic mechanical nature. The former tend to be philosophical, free will advocates and the latter tend to be determinists and/or behaviorists.

I'm planning on writing several pieces over the next month exploring the questions and theories of mind and hope that you, the readers, will find it as fascinating to read about as i have.